| Battle of Chamdo | |||||||||
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| Part of the Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China and the Cold War | |||||||||
PLA troops crossing the Jinsha River prior to the battle. | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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| Strength | |||||||||
| Tibetan Army: 8,500[3] | People's Liberation Army: 40,000[4][5] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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180 killed or wounded[6][7][8] 2,000 killed (PRIO estimate)[9] 3,341 killed, wounded, surrendered, captured, or defected (Chinese estimate)[2] |
114 killed or wounded[6] 2,000 killed (PRIO estimate)[9] | ||||||||
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The Battle of Chamdo (or Qamdo; Chinese: 昌都战役) occurred from 6 to 24 October 1950.[10][11] It was a military campaign by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to capture the Chamdo Region from a de facto independent Tibetan state.[12][13][14][15] PRC victory led to the annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China.
Background
[edit]While political tensions existed between some Khampa groups and the Lhasa government, this did not translate into broad support for the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Most Khampa communities regarded the advance of Chinese forces as an external invasion, and resistance was limited chiefly by poor armament, lack of unified command, and strategic decisions made in Lhasa rather than by any sympathy toward Chinese rule.[16][17]
Some Khampa leaders, such as the influential Pandatsang family, had previously opposed Lhasa’s authority and sought greater regional autonomy. Chinese Communist officials attempted to exploit these internal divisions and approached the Pandatsang brothers in 1950, proposing cooperation during the “liberation of Tibet.” The Pandatsangs ultimately declined and instead sent George Patterson to India to seek alternative support.[18]
Despite early setbacks in 1950, Khampa fighters would later form the core of the Chushi Gangdruk resistance movement, which mounted sustained armed opposition to Chinese control throughout the late 1950s.[19]
PLA enters eastern Kham
[edit]
After the defeat of major Kuomintang forces in the Chinese Civil War, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) turned its attention to the Republic of China territories in the hinterland. Eastern Kham was the Chinese-held part of Sikang and the gateway to Tibetan areas. The 18th Army of the PLA formed the leading detachment advancing toward Tibet with the 52nd Division as its main force, and arrived at Ya'an on 12 February 1950. In March, the People's Liberation Army arrived in Kangding (Tachienlu). By mid-April, the 18th Army had at least 30,000 passing through Kangding, and 10,000 Tibetans helped to build the road from Kangding to Garzê (Kandze), which was completed in August. The 18th Army of the PLA assembled at Garzê on 30 July, headquartered at Xinlong, and entered Litang from the east. The Qinghai Cavalry Detachment entered Gyêgu on 22 July, forming a north–south pincer on Chamdo.[20]
Battle over Dengke
[edit]The first clashes between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Tibetan forces occurred in June 1950 at Dengke (also known as Dengo), a town located on the route between Garzê and Yushu, northeast of Chamdo. Tibetan officials had established a radio relay station there under the direction of former Chamdo governor Lhalu Tsewang Dorje. A detachment of PLA troops captured the town and destroyed the station, forcing Tibetan personnel to retreat.[21]
In July, approximately 800 Khampa militiamen—including several hundred monastic fighters—carried out a counterattack on Dengke. Tibetan and Khampa oral accounts claim substantial casualties inflicted on PLA forces, although independent verification is limited and historians generally treat the casualty figures reported by both sides as exaggerated.[22] Despite localized resistance, PLA forces gradually secured control over eastern Kham due to superior numbers, logistics, and weaponry rather than lack of Tibetan opposition.
Invasion and capture of Chamdo
[edit]After months of unsuccessful negotiations between Lhasa and Beijing, and simultaneous military buildups on both sides, the PLA began its main offensive on 6–7 October 1950 by crossing the Jinsha River at several points along the frontier controlled by the Lhasa government.[23] Tibetan frontier forces resisted at multiple crossings but were outnumbered and outgunned.
By 19 October, coordinated PLA units captured Chamdo, the headquarters of the Tibetan governor of Eastern Tibet. Tibetan casualties are estimated in the hundreds, while figures claimed in Chinese military memoirs—such as the destruction or “liquidation” of several thousand Tibetan troops—are regarded as inflated and not confirmed by independent sources.[24] Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the governor of Chamdo, surrendered with approximately 2,700 soldiers, many of whom were subsequently disarmed and released.
The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) estimates total casualties, including noncombatants, at around 2,000 on each side.[25]
Although the PLA temporarily halted large-scale operations after the fall of Chamdo, its commanders used the victory to pressure Lhasa to send representatives to Beijing. The Tibetan delegation, instructed to seek guarantees for the Dalai Lama’s authority and internal autonomy, departed for Beijing later in October.[26]
Following the invasion, resistance continued in several parts of Kham, where Khampa militias and local chieftains later formed the basis of the Chushi Gangdrug movement. Beginning in the mid-1950s, this force mounted sustained guerrilla resistance to PLA authority and eventually received covert support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[27]
Aftermath
[edit]After releasing the captured soldiers, Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites would not be denied their positions and power.[28]
Some Khampa fighters continued their opposition. Local warlords later became united under a common objective and hence resulted in the formation of Chushi Gangdruk with assistance from the CIA.[29]
According to contemporary author Melvyn Goldstein, the campaign aimed to capture the Lhasa army occupying Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and to exert pressure to get Tibetan representatives to agree to negotiations in Beijing and sign terms recognizing China's sovereignty over Tibet.[30]
See also
[edit]- British expedition to Tibet (1903–1904)
- Chinese expedition to Tibet (1910)
- Sino-Tibetan War (1930–1932)
- Qinghai–Tibet War (1932)
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ Mackerras, Colin. Yorke, Amanda. The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. [1991]. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-38755-8. p. 100.
- ^ a b Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1991). A history of modern Tibet, 1913–1951, the demise of the lamaist state. University of California Press. p. 639.
- ^ Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama, 14th Dalai Lama, London: Little, Brown and Co, 1990 ISBN 0-349-10462-X
- ^ Laird 2006 p. 301.
- ^ Shakya 1999, p. 43
- ^ a b Jiawei Wang et Nima Gyaincain, The historical Status of China's Tibet, China Intercontinental Press, 1997, p. 209 (see also The Local Government of Tibet Refused Peace Talks and the PLA Was Forced to Fight the Qamdo Battle, china.com.cn): "The Qamdo battle thus came to a victorious end on 24 October, with 114 PLA soldiers and 180 Tibetan troops killed or wounded."
- ^ Shakya 1999, p. 45. Shakya also quotes PRC sources reporting 5738 enemy troops "liquidated" and over 5700 "destroyed". Shakya does not provide an estimate of PRC casualties.
- ^ Feigon 1996, p. 144.
- ^ a b Lacina, Bethany (2009). "PRIO battle deaths dataset, 1946-2008, version 3.0: Documentation of coding decisions". Peace Research Institute Oslo. p. 129.
- ^ "Chinese Reds Promise the 'Liberation' of Tibet". The New York Times. 3 September 1949.
- ^ NOTE: The exiled Tibetan government in India calls The battle the "...invasion of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army of China," see Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts. The Status of Tibet: "At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and by law."
- ^ Tsering Shakya, Dragon in The Land of Snows: The History of Modern Tibet since 1947, Random House, 2012, Google e-book: "Tibet had never received de jure recognition from any state; in any case such recognition would be disputed not only by Beijing but also by the nationalist regime in Taiwan.
- ^ Stephanie Roemer, The Tibetan government-in-exile: politics at large, p. 32: "the Tibetans signed the so-called 'Seventeen Point Agreement', where they officially acknowledged the Chinese intentions to liberate Tibet, which meant the end of Tibet's de-facto independence."
- ^ John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan struggle for survival[permanent dead link], p. 84 : The seventeen points of the agreement ended the de facto independence of Tibet.
- ^ Shakya 1999 pp. 28–32.
- ^ Shakya, Tsering (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Penguin. pp. 40–44.
- ^ Goldstein, Melvyn C. (2007). A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm, 1951–1955. University of California Press. pp. 68–71.
- ^ Lezlee Brown Halper; Stefan A. Halper (2014). Tibet: An Unfinished Story. Oxford University Press. p. 89. ISBN 978-0-19-936836-5.
- ^ Knaus, John (1999). Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. PublicAffairs. pp. 64–67.
- ^ Dunham, Mikel (2005). Buddha's warriors : the story of the CIA-backed Tibetan freedom fighters, the Chinese invasion, and the ultimate fall of Tibet. New Delhi: Penguin Books. pp. 54–60, 62. ISBN 0144001047. OCLC 224529359.
- ^ Shakya, Tsering (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows. Penguin. pp. 40–41.
- ^ Goldstein, Melvyn C. (2007). A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm, 1951–1955. University of California Press. pp. 68–71.
- ^ Shakya, Tsering (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows. pp. 41–43.
- ^ Goldstein, Melvyn C. (2007). A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2. pp. 70–72.
- ^ "Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Conflict Data".
- ^ Shakya, Tsering (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows. pp. 43–44.
- ^ Knaus, John (1999). Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. PublicAffairs. pp. 64–67.
- ^ Laird, 2006 p. 306.
- ^ Knaus, John Kenneth (2008). Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. PublicAffairs. p. 71. ISBN 978-0786724031. Retrieved 24 April 2014.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, vol. 2, pp. 48–49.
Sources
[edit]- Feigon, Lee. Demystifying Tibet: Unlocking the Secrets of the Land of Snows (1996) Ivan R. Dee Inc. ISBN 1-56663-089-4.
- Ford, Robert. Wind Between The Worlds The extraordinary first-person account of a Westerner's life in Tibet as an official of the Dalai Lama (1957) David Mckay Co., Inc.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 1: 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989) University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-06140-8.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm 1951–1955 (2007) University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24941-7.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (1997) University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21254-1.
- Grunfeld, A. Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet (1996) East Gate Book. ISBN 978-1-56324-713-2.
- Knaus, Robert Kenneth. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (1999) PublicAffairs . ISBN 978-1-891620-18-8.
- Laird, Thomas. The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama (2006) Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-1827-5.
- Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon In The Land Of Snows (1999) Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11814-7.
- Robert W. Ford Captured in Tibet, Oxford University Press, 1990, ISBN 978-0-19-581570-2.
