^Regarding the 1936 Soviet Constitution, Getty wrote: "Many who lauded Stalin's Soviet Union as the most democratic country on earth lived to regret their words. After all, the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was adopted on the eve of the Great Terror of the late 1930s; the 'thoroughly democratic' elections to the first Supreme Soviet permitted only uncontested candidates and took place at the height of the savage violence in 1937. The civil rights, personal freedoms, and democratic forms promised in the Stalin constitution were trampled almost immediately and remained dead letters until long after Stalin's death."[11]
^Getty wrote: "Stalin gave his backing to radicals in the Party who saw the mixed economy of the Twenties as an unwarranted concession to capitalism. These leftists, for whom Stalin was spokesman and leader, argued that the free market in grain confronted the state with an unpredictable, inefficient and expensive food supply. ... These radical activists, who became the shock troops of the voluntarist 'Stalin Revolution' which swept the Soviet Union in the Thirties, were concentrated in working-class and youth groups. ... The collectivisation of agriculture from 1929 to about 1934 proceeded in several fitful campaigns characterised by confusion, lurches to left and right, and the substitution of enthusiasm, exhortation and violence for careful planning. Hard-line officials and volunteers forced reluctant peasants into improvised collective farms. Peasants resisted by slaughtering animals and refusing to plant, harvest or market grain. Neither side would give way. By 1934 the Stalinists had won, at least insofar as the collective farm system was permanently established, but they had paid a painful price: catastrophic livestock losses, social dislocation and, in some places, famine. Millions of people died from starvation, deportation and violence."[14]
^“Faculty page”. History.ucla.edu. University of Los Angeles, California. 27 August 2016閲覧。
^Sarah Davies; James Harris (8 September 2005). “Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas”. Stalin: A New History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN978-1-139-44663-1. "In 1953, Carl Friedrich characterised totalitarian systems in terms of five points: an official ideology, control of weapons and of media, use of terror, and a single mass party, 'usually under a single leader'. There was of course an assumption that the leader was critical to the workings of totalitarianism: at the apex of a monolithic, centralised, and hierarchical system, it was he who issued the orders which were fulfilled unquestioningly by his subordinates."
^Sarah Davies; James Harris (8 September 2005). “Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas”. Stalin: A New History. Cambridge University Press. p. 3. ISBN978-1-139-44663-1. "Academic Sovietology, a child of the early Cold War, was dominated by the 'totalitarian model' of Soviet politics. Until the 1960s it was almost impossible to advance any other interpretation, in the USA at least."
^Sarah Davies; James Harris (8 September 2005). “Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas”. Stalin: A New History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 4–5. ISBN978-1-139-44663-1. "Tucker's work stressed the absolute nature of Stalin's power, an assumption which was increasingly challenged by later revisionist historians. In his Origins of the Great Purges, Arch Getty argued that the Soviet political system was chaotic, that institutions often escaped the control of the centre, and that Stalin’s leadership consisted to a considerable extent in responding, on an ad hoc basis, to political crises as they arose. Getty's work was influenced by political science of the 1960s onwards, which, in a critique of the totalitarian model, began to consider the possibility that relatively autonomous bureaucratic institutions might have had some influence on policy-making at the highest level."
^Lenoe, Matt (2002). “Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?”. The Journal of Modern History74 (2): 352–380. doi:10.1086/343411. ISSN0022-2801.
^ abcLenoe, Matt (2002). “Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?”. The Journal of Modern History74 (2): 352–380. doi:10.1086/343411. ISSN0022-2801.
^Wheatcroft, Stephen G. (1999). “Victims of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data. Not the Last Word”. Europe-Asia Studies51 (2): 340–342. doi:10.1080/09668139999056. http://sovietinfo.tripod.com/WCR-Secret_Police.pdf. "For decades, many historians counted Stalin' s victims in 'tens of millions', which was a figure supported by Solzhenitsyn. Since the collapse of the USSR, the lower estimates of the scale of the camps have been vindicated. The arguments about excess mortality are far more complex than normally believed. R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A Re-assessment (London, 1992) does not really get to grips with the new data and continues to present an exaggerated picture of the repression. The view of the 'revisionists' has been largely substantiated (J. Arch Getty & R. T. Manning (eds), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge, 1993)). The popular press, even TLS and The Independent, have contained erroneous journalistic articles that should not be cited in respectable academic articles."