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Conservative left in Peru

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The then-candidate for Free Peru, Pedro Castillo during the campaign for the 2021 Peruvian general election, which he would go on to win. Behind Castillo is a sign in favour of constitutional reform; the then-president and his ruling party shared this view with other Peruvian left-wing groups, but not on issues such as sexual and gender minorities, or gender equality.

"Conservative left" (Spanish: "izquierda conservadora"[a]) is an umbrella term used to designate left-wing political groups in Peru whose ideology is socially conservative and departs from more progressive social positions in this sense,[18] giving priority to more economic aspects.

These terms are linked to the Andean region [es] of the country and are used to differentiate from the other part of the left, which generally defends civil liberties, with which they have often been in rivalry since the 2010s, as is the case between Vladimir Cerrón and Verónika Mendoza.[19][20][21]

Background

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The conservatism of the Peruvian left dates back to the 20th century, when the country was immersed in moderate civilian reformism and adopted some ideas from the Nueva Izquierda.[22] During the regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), the Fuerzas Armadas carried out reforms that were not universally popular and had authoritarian overtones. Eric Hobsbawm described it as a peculiar revolution.[23] David Scott Palmer described it as a reformist experiment of a conservative and bureaucratic nature. Abraham F. Lowenthal said that it also had an "ambiguity" because its revolutionary rhetoric was contradictory to, or even incongruous with, its political practice.[23] Velasco Alvarado was succeeded by Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Pablo Macera commented that "in Peruvian history there has always been a left-wing tendency, in unequal combat with conservative tendencies." Therefore, he added, in the last years of the century, "those leftist groups that interpreted and adopted the interests of these sectors" deviated towards a "deviant" solution towards the informal economy, which he called "shady or underhanded capitalism".[24]

Around the beginning of the 1980s, when Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre died, the legacy of the veteran American Popular Revolutionary Alliance was contested by two factions, one of which was led by Andrés Townsend [es].[25] A peaceful solution was planned in which representatives of both positions would participate in the United Left coalition for the 1980 Peruvian general election. However, the solution failed, and Townsend left APRA to form the Hayist Bases Movement,[25] which joined the Democratic Convergence coalition for the 1985 elections, in which he was elected to Congress.

In the 1990s, part of the political left supported the government of Alberto Fujimori [es], amidst the crisis of political parties at the time. Subsequently, some Latin American countries entered a period of "lost decade" between 1998 and 2002, due to the economic stagnation of governments implementing neoliberalism, including in Peru. Political scientist Daniel Zovatto [es] noted that the phenomenon ended with a shift to the left and center-left in several countries.[26]

The Humala family entered Peruvian politics through Andean nationalist movements. This led to the formation of the Ethnocacerist and Peruvian Nationalist Party, in which the Humala family participated.[27] Avanza País, founded by Pedro Cenas Casamayor [es], included Ulises Humala [es] as its leader.[28]

In 2006, Mirko Lauer [es] considered that the population's complaints regarding the promises made by Alejandro Toledo, during the last year of his government [es], had motivated the emergence of new movements of Andean origin.[29]

Uses of the term

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Humala family as representatives

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"We cannot be conservative; we must move forward so that we can generate jobs and get the economy moving, so that Peru will always be an attractive market for future investments"

— Ollanta Humala responding to Radio Programas del Perú about the social aspects of his government in 2011[30]

The adoption of the concept of conservative left occurred in the mid-2010s. Previously, the Spanish newspaper El Mundo noted in 2010 that a new Peruvian left existed and that regional movements were gaining public support in the regional and municipal elections of that year [es], in which National Solidarity and Popular Force chose not to participate.[31]

Ollanta Humala assumed the presidency of the Republic in 2011, promoting investment in some social programs, education, health, and defense; however, his positions were not significantly progressive compared to other countries during the "Pink tide" across Latin America.[32] The Economist described him as a "man of the left who had governed like a conservative" for betraying his ideological principles after running in the 2011 general election.[33][34] Javier Diez Canseco noted that he had distanced himself from the support of popular sectors and political figures such as Alejandro Toledo.[35] Analyst Félix Reátegui indicated that the State had prioritized the exploitation of natural resources to maintain the country's stability, but this measure had generated economic asymmetries and growing social discontent.[36] Fujimorist leader Keiko Fujimori supported the cabinet changes of Ollanta Humala due to the protests against him and stated that she "was committed to governability".[35]

Ollanta Humala was an important figure in the 21st-century conservative movement long before the Peruvian political crisis began in 2016,according to political scientist Rodrigo Gil Piedra, who described it as a stage of "embryonic politicization".[37] His family was connected to ethnocacerism, an ideological current that the Página/12 website described in 2006 as "a combination of homophobia, xenophobia, antisemitism, and militarism".[38] With Humala's rise to prominence, the figure of Gregorio Santos [es], regional governor of Cajamarca between 2011 and 2014, also emerged, who was also described as "conservative left-wing.[39]

The ethnocacerist leader Antauro Humala has been described as a figure who uses "a radical left-conservative discourse, with "fascistoides" traits and promises of a hardline, militarist approach and a foundational discourse with extreme radicalism," according to Peruvian analyst Carlos Meléndez.[40] Ulises Humala [es] differentiated between the two political figures in his family: Antauro was closer to the radical nationalist ideas of Isaac Humala, while Ollanta chose to form his own party, the Peruvian Nationalist Party, since he believed that voters did not want "radical option".[41]

The Union for Peru party, which held congressional representation during the 2020-2021 term and was led by Antauro Humala, was considered "conservative left".[39] During the elections for that supplementary term, an alliance was announced between the New Peru, led by Verónika Mendoza, and Free Peru, led by Vladimir Cerrón. Verónika Mendoza did not enjoy a good reputation among the conservative Andean population, according to Alfredo Torres of Ipsos Perú.[42] In that context, then-former president Ollanta Humala accused Verónika Mendoza, the leader of New Peru and a key member of Together for Peru, of co-governing in the transitional government of Francisco Sagasti by placing many members of these organizations in positions of power, such as Óscar Ugarte in the Ministry of Health.[43]

The announcement by New Peru prompted the resignation of the LGBT community and feminists from the party, as they stated that "the leadership has decided to ally itself with one of the most conservative parties, Free Peru, which despises our lives and one of the tools that can help us live with dignity: the gender perspective". This came after Cerrón, the party's presidential candidate, declared in 2016 that "as a left-wing party, we respect the private lives of each of them [the LGBT community]. What we cannot tolerate is the adoption of people who do not choose that cultural pattern, which is not the norm in Peru". In 2019, when he was regional governor of Junín, he had announced the implementation of an educational curriculum for the region without a gender perspective and commented on his social media: "Our people, full of family values, will never be able to accept it".[44][45][46] As a result, New Peru broke its alliance with Free Peru and established ties with Together for Peru, led by Yehude Simon.[47]

Pedro Castillo and Vladimir Cerrón as new representatives

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Awarding of a medal by then-Foreign Minister Rafael Roncagliolo to the director of USAID Perú Richard Goughnour in 2011. The conservative left associates this US government agency with caviarismo and US imperialism in the country.

In 2021, Pedro Castillo had become a prominent figure on the provincial left, enjoying the support of his constituents in the Peruvian Andes.[48] During the 2021 Peruvian general election, the then-candidate for Free Peru identified himself as a "Profamilia [es] teacher" and asserted that the two go hand in hand.[49] He was described as a left-wing candidate with conservative tendencies,[50][51][52][53] with proposals labeled populist b Ojo Público and El Español.[54][55] According to historian Daniel Parodi of Antonio Ruiz de Montoya University, the president adopted a rather conservative and misogynistic Andean worldview.[48] Vladimír Cerrón did not run in the presidential elections due to legal issues.

"We have to tell boys and girls, there are little girls with penises and vaginas, there are little boys with penises and vaginas, where are we, comrades? We have to repudiate that attitude, we have to throw all that idiosyncrasy in the trash"

— Pedro Castillo responding to the question of trans people in Peru during the 2021 election.[56]

In the midst of the second round, the forces of Free Peru, also described as "conservative left," managed to reach an agreement with the "progressive left" (described by Cerrón as "caviares")[57][58] to confront the right-wing candidacy of Keiko Fujimori.[59] After Castillo's victory, Vladimir Cerrón was clear that "the country is preparing to be led by the left, and not just any left, but by the popular, chola, rebellious, plebeian left".[60] The economist specializing in sustainable development, Hugo Cabieses, commented that Castillo's election was "the revenge of the conservative sectors of the left".[61]

In the early years of his administration, Pedro Castillo's cabinet was described as "a conservative, traditional, and 'anachronistic' left-wing government " due to the presence of figures such as Héctor Béjar and Ciro Gálvez in ministerial positions.[62] Soon, the so-called "conservative left" clashed with its counterpart, the "progressive left," accusing the latter of having "captured [es] President Pedro Castillo".[63][64]

In 2022, news outlets reported that several evangelical movements, including the leader of "Con mis hijos no te metas", had met with Pedro Castillo at Sarratea's house[65] due to their shared conservative affinity for preventing any changes to the student curriculum that would limit evangelical influence on the education of minors regarding sexual diversity and gender studies.[66][67][68]

By February 2022, the split between the two left-wing factions was formalized with the progressive sector's departure from the government and its move to the opposition following the resignation of Pedro Francke and Anahí Durand from their ministerial posts and the subsequent appointment of Katy Ugarte as Minister of Women [es] in the cabinet of Héctor Valer, despite Ugarte's opposition to the gender perspective during the election campaign.[69] Both Valer's cabinet and the subsequent one under Aníbal Torres were characterized as conservative.[70]

By June of the same year, Castillo resigned from Free Peru and governed as an independent after distancing himself from Cerrón.[71][72] Free Peru congresswoman, Kelly Portalatino [es], accused Pedro Castillo of having right-wing and centrist advisors who "make governance look bad".[73] La Encerrona [es] journalist, Jonathan Castro Cajahuanca, described Free Peru's betrayal of Castillo as having waged "more dirty war online against LGBT+ discourse" than the far-right, ultraconservative Popular Renewal.[74] Free Peru received an invitation from one of its members and Vladimir's brother, Waldemar Cerrón, to join the Democratic Bloc coalition;[75] while organizing parliamentary sessions to promote Cerrón for the upcoming 2026 presidential elections.[76]

Following Castillo's attempted self-coup in December 2022 and the subsequent social upheaval, groups identified with the conservative and populist left demanded Castillo's reinstatement as president,[77][78] after he had been third impeachment of Pedro Castillo, and rejected the notion that Castillo had staged a self-coup. These groups differed from progressive groups, who accepted that he had indeed carried out a self-coup.[79] Dina Boluarte, Castillo's former vice president, distanced herself from the left-wing political platform of her candidacy and, during her administration, aligned herself with conservative positions, primarily from the political right.[80] As a result, the political right eliminated all references to provincialism within its circles of power.[81] Castillo criticized treaties "against the rights of the country" such as UNCLOS, agreeing with business associations, and accused Dina Boluarte of provoking a "crime of treason" when she signed an apparently similar one, the High Seas Treaty.[82]

Following the suspension of USAID activities by President Donald Trump, Cerrón declared in 2025 through X that "two types of left operate in Peru: the USAID left (referring to progressives) and the popular left (referring to Free Peru and similar leftist movements).[83] Cerrón attempted to link Verónika Mendoza and her party as "highly dependent" on NGOs linked to USAID and alleged that they "receive advice, employment, and possibly funding," although there is no evidence to support this.[54] Waldemar Cerrón, for his part, published an article entitled "The Ideology of the New Popular Left", in which he proclaimed Free Peru as representative of this ideology.[84]

In 2026, Congressman José María Balcázar of Free Peru, temporarily assumed the presidency. Vladimir Cerrón, who remained in hiding while attempting to run in 2026 Peruvian general election, claimed that his party had broken away from Popular Force[85] and urged Balcázar to carry out the planned actions during his transitional government.[85][86] Balcázar responded by disassociating himself from Free Peru and appointing Hernando de Soto as Prime Minister.[87] Although de Soto's candidacy for prime minister failed, and Denisse Miralles, took his place, her cabinet was accused of being pressured by Cerrón to change it, according to Balcázar himself, though the latter dismissed this as just a "joke".[88] Cerrón later claimed to have a close friendship with the then-president.[89]

Other applications

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The perception of social conservatism on the political left also leans towards radical groups like the Shining Path. Gonzalo Thought is one of the doctrines with authoritarian features that Shining Path promoted while carrying out cleansing against sexual minorities and ignoring feminism.[90] urthermore, the radical group affected the image of indigenism in Peru and replaced it with a peasant class aligned with the goals of the traditional left.[91]

In the case of the conservative right, Fujimorism also sympathizes with ideas based on the political left: due to the rejection of the neoliberal legacy of Alberto Fujimori. His daughter Keiko promised social welfare programs if she won the elections.[92] Pedro Castillo coined the term "Fujicerronism" to refer to a possible alliance between the Free Peru and Popular Force parties that the diplomatic conflict [es] with Mexico and other countries that do not share the alliance's ideals.[93] Congressman Roberto Sánchez of Juntos por el Perú has called himself Pedro Castillo's "ideological heir.[94]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ The conservative left in Peru is referred to by various other names, such as the "popular left" and "provincial left"; ethnocacerists refer to left-conservatism as the "macho left'".[1][2] Liberals and right-wing conservatives in Peru generally disparage the conservative left as the "chola left'", "terrorist-sympathizing left",[3] "crude and thuggish left",[4] "anti-rights left", [5] and as the "social malcontents"[6][7][8][9] or adherents of "wild populism".[10] Adherents of left-conservatism have coalesced under labels such as "Velasquismo", "Humalismo",[11] "Antaurismo",[12][13] "Cerronismo",[14][15] and "Castillismo".[16][17]

References

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  1. ^ "Antauro Humala califica a SL y MRTA de "izquierda macha"". Diario Correo (in Spanish). 25 November 2012. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  2. ^ ""Izquierda femenina" de Mendoza e "izquierda macha" de Castillo procrean un nuevo Perú". Lima Gris (in Spanish). 5 May 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  3. ^ "La izquierda Plaza Sésamo". Diario Correo (in Spanish). 5 November 2009. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  4. ^ "Carlos Bruce: "La izquierda bruta y achorada"". Perú21 (in Spanish). 17 December 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  5. ^ "Zárate: "La izquierda muy conservadora y antiderechos todavía atrae a mucha gente"". Ojo Público (in Spanish). 7 December 2025. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  6. ^ "Entre la rabia y la ceguera". La Mula (in Spanish). 23 January 2023. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  7. ^ "Orígenes del actual odio social peruano". Expreso (in Spanish). 23 January 2023. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  8. ^ "Incompetentes y resentidos". El Búho.pe (in Spanish). 14 August 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  9. ^ "Phillip Butters afirma que Aníbal Torres es "un resentido social" tras violentas protestas". Willax TV (in Spanish). 7 February 2023. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  10. ^ "El populista silvestre". El Comercio (in Spanish). 21 August 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  11. ^ "Pasión y muerte del humalismo". Perú21 (in Spanish). 20 April 2024. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  12. ^ "El antaurismo tambalea". Perú21 (in Spanish). 29 December 2024. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  13. ^ "El antaurismo y la democracia defensiva". La Noticia (in Spanish). 4 November 2024. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  14. ^ "El cerronismo amenaza la paz social". RPP (in Spanish). 11 May 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  15. ^ "Cerrón, una expresión del caudillismo peruano". Areuipa Misti Press (in Spanish). 25 August 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  16. ^ "La ardua ruta del castillismo". Diario Red (in Spanish). 6 June 2025. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  17. ^ "Un castillismo para el 2026". Sudaca (in Spanish). 8 July 2024. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  18. ^ Lafuente, Javier (18 April 2021). "Kirchner, Uribe, Morales, Fujimori... El pasado pesa mucho en América Latina". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 23 February 2025. Ahí está el caso, enfatiza, de Pedro Castillo, que se disputará la presidencia de Perú con Keiko Fujimori: frente a la "izquierda caviar" promueve una "izquierda provinciana" y que enarbola la bandera "profamilia", rechaza la despenalización del aborto o el matrimonio igualitario
  19. ^ Ortiz Martínez, Sebastian (8 April 2021). "Los puntos de encuentro entre Mendoza y Castillo: El cambio de Constitución y un Estado protagonista" (in Spanish). El Comercio. ISSN 1605-3052. Retrieved 23 February 2025. El analista político Gonzalo Banda explicó que las dos izquierdas "son bien distintas", porque la de Juntos por el Perú representa a una corriente progresistas, mientras que la de Perú Libre a una provinciana y alto andina
  20. ^ SAC, Instituto Pacífico. "Vladimir Cerrón y Verónika Mendoza, divorcio al rojo vivo". Actualidad Gubernamental. Retrieved 24 February 2025.
  21. ^ Melo, Yenny (25 July 2023). "Vladimir Cerrón responde críticas de Verónika Mendoza por alianza con el fujimorismo y la califica de 'parásita'". infobae (in European Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2025.
  22. ^ Lozoya, Ivette (9 August 2024). "Intelectuales políticos peruanos de los años 60. Una primera aproximación". Sur y Tiempo: Revista de Historia de América (in Spanish). 5 (10). ISSN 2452-574X. Archived from the original on 8 December 2024. Retrieved 1 May 2025.
  23. ^ a b Meza-Bazán, Mario (2022). "The New Left and the competition for the revolution in Peru during the Velasco government. 1968 - 1975". Izquierdas. 51: 0–0. doi:10.4067/S0718-50492022000100201. ISSN 0718-5049. Retrieved 21 February 2025.
  24. ^ Urrutia, Carlos (May 1984). "IU, Sendero y el futuro" (PDF). El Búho (2). Distribuidora Inca: 22, 23.
  25. ^ a b Tanaka, Martín (1998). Los espejismos de la democracia: El colapso del sistema de partidos en el Perú, 1980-1995, en perspectiva comparada (PDF). Ideología y política (in Spanish). Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. ISBN 9972-51-022-0. ISSN 1019-455X. Retrieved 21 February 2025. En el caso del APRA, la trayectoria de Andrés Townsend es también reveladora. Fue miembro de la Asamblea Constituyente entre 1978 y 1979 y uno de los máximos líderes del partido. Muerto Haya de la Torre en 1979, el APRA se enfrascó en una fuerte lucha interna por definir la herencia política y la sucesión de su líder histórico. Se formaron dos facciones principales: una encabezada por Armando Villanueva, quien representaba la herencia más radical del aprismo, y otra, encabezada por Townsend, tenía un perfil más conservador. En las elecciones presidenciales de 1980, el APRA llegó a una solución de compromiso transitoria para evitar la división: el candidato presidencial fue Villanueva y el postulante a la primera vicepresidencia, Townsend. Sin embargo, meses después, las diferencias se agravaron y, derrotado en la lucha intrapartidaria, Townsend se alejó del APRA para fundar el Movimiento de Bases Hayistas.
  26. ^ "América Latina está optando por gobiernos más pragmáticos". La Nación (in Spanish). 11 January 2016. Retrieved 27 March 2025. (Dice el politólogo Daniel Zovatto:) "A mediados de la década de los 90, América Latina tuvo su media década perdida (1998-2002) porque la región perdió su rumbo económico y vino una desaceleración y fue cuando vino la gran crítica al neoliberalismo, a las privatizaciones y el cambio de ciclo político: pasamos de gobiernos de centroderecha al ingreso de gobiernos de centroizquierda. Aparece Chávez , luego Lula, después Kirchner y sucesivamente".
  27. ^ Mansilla Blanco, Roberto (20 January 2006). "El "guerrero" andino". IGADI (in European Spanish). Retrieved 25 February 2025.
  28. ^ "Hermano de Ollanta Humala no cree en el cambio del candidato presidencial". infobae (in European Spanish). 1 April 2011. Retrieved 25 February 2025.
  29. ^ Lauer, Mirko (6 April 2006). "Ni la mano firme es tan firme, ni la mano dura dura mucho". Diario La República. Archived from the original on 19 November 2007. Retrieved 25 February 2025.
  30. ^ "Humala asegura que no será conservador para aplicar programas sociales". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). 14 August 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  31. ^ "Una nueva izquierda peruana mide hoy sus fuerzas en las elecciones regionales". El Mundo. Retrieved 27 March 2025.
  32. ^ Merino Acuña, Roger Arturo (30 January 2019). "Perú: escenarios electorales del conservadurismo hacia 2021". El Búho. Retrieved 20 February 2025.
  33. ^ Cruz, Jorge Luis (2 December 2016). "¿Fue Ollanta Humala un líder de la izquierda en Perú?". RPP Noticias (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 February 2025. . Izquierda 'conservadora'. La revista inglesa The Economist analizó el Gobierno de Ollanta Humala en 2013, apenas dos años después de que asumió la presidencia, desgastado por el contexto y sus decisiones, alejado de todo movimiento de izquierda y bajo la mirada desconfiada de los empresarios
  34. ^ ""Humala fue elegido como un hombre de izquierda pero ha gobernado como conservador"". Gestión (in Spanish). 2 August 2013. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  35. ^ a b "Tras el alejamiento de Toledo, la izquierda podría distanciarse de Humala". infobae (in European Spanish). 10 November 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  36. ^ Reátegui, Félix (March 2012). "Conservadurismo y una gobernabilidad sin garantías". Revista Ideele (in Spanish). Retrieved 18 February 2026.
  37. ^ Chávez Yacila, Rosa (13 October 2024). "Rodrigo Gil Piedra: "Quien va ganando para la campaña de 2026 es el movimiento conservador"". Ojo Público (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 February 2025.
  38. ^ "Con una familia como los Humala..." Página/12 (in Spanish). 22 March 2006. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  39. ^ a b Caviglia, Alessandro. "CONGRESO CON SORPRESAS". caviglia.lamula.pe (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  40. ^ Cifuentes, Cristina (15 November 2020). "Antauro Humala: El líder antisistema de la política peruana". La Tercera. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  41. ^ Tejada, Carlos (5 January 2006). "Ulises Humala, hermano de Antauro, también quiere ser presidente de Perú". DiarioDigitalRD (in Spanish). Retrieved 22 February 2025. "La fuerza de voto mayoritario del Partido Nacionalista Peruano es centro sierra y sur del país. No creo que la población de esas zonas considere opciones radicales", explicó al insistir en que Antauro Humala, quien en carácter es más parecido a su padre Isaac Humala, y el etnocacerismo proponen un nacionalismo auténtico y el PNP ha desviado su planteamiento hacia otros lineamientos
  42. ^ Torres, Alfredo (19 October 2025). "Lecciones de 2021 para 2026". peru21.pe (in Spanish). Retrieved 19 October 2025. [Verónika Mendoza], quizá [en] su condición de mujer progresista, no resultaba particularmente atractiva para electores conservadores andinos
  43. ^ "Humala: "Mendoza está cogobernando y le han dado el Ministerio de Salud"". La República (in Spanish). 31 March 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2026. En efecto, el también exmandatario cuestionó que el Poder Ejecutivo haya puesto en el cargo de este sector al médico Óscar Ugarte, quien anteriormente fue miembro fundador del Partido Humanista Peruano, que actualmente integra Juntos por el Perú, organización que quiere llevar a Mendoza a Palacio de Gobierno.
  44. ^ Ortiz Martínez, Sebastian (25 October 2019). ""Nuevo Perú ha decidido ir en alianza con un partido que desprecia nuestras vidas"" (in Spanish). El Comercio. ISSN 1605-3052. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  45. ^ Admin (18 November 2019). "Richard Arce sobre Nuevo Perú: El intento de alianza con Perú Libre fue una aventura electoral". Ideele Radio. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  46. ^ RedacciónRPP (26 October 2019). "Tres claves para entender la polémica por la alianza entre Nuevo Perú y el partido de Vladimir Cerrón | RPP Noticias". rpp.pe (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  47. ^ Zubieta Pacco, René (1 November 2019). "Vladimir Cerrón: ¿Quién es el líder de Perú Libre?" (in Spanish). El Comercio. ISSN 1605-3052. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  48. ^ a b "[Podcast] Daniel Parodi: "El voto por Castillo es identitario más que un ideológico"". UARM (in Spanish). 2 June 2021. Retrieved 23 February 2025.
  49. ^ Fowks, Jacqueline (16 April 2021). "Castillo versus Fujimori: Opuestos, pero no tanto". Semanario Brecha (in Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2025. El periodista le recordó que el líder de su partido dijo en alguna entrevista: «Nuestro pueblo, lleno de valores familiares, jamás podrá aceptar el enfoque de género». Y le preguntó si él es «profamilia». «No sólo somos profamilia: hay que defender a la familia en la escuela. Pensar en otra cosa es quebrar a la familia. Como maestro, respetamos los valores de la familia y hay que profundizarla», contestó. […] «La familia y la escuela: estas dos instituciones tienen que ir de la mano», añadió el candidato de la izquierda
  50. ^ De la Puente, Juan (2022). "Los cuatro Castillo". Quehacer. Retrieved 24 February 2025. Castillo fue un candidato que representaba un poco de cada valor del escenario: cambio, antipolítica, hartazgo y conservadurismo social, entre otros
  51. ^ "Quién es Pedro Castillo, el candidato de izquierda y maestro de escuela que fue la sorpresa en las elecciones en Perú". infobae (in European Spanish). 12 April 2021. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  52. ^ Ballón, Eduardo. "Pedro Castillo: palabra de profesor". Quehacer. Retrieved 22 February 2025. De ese universo -el más estrictamente rural y familiar- proviene el innegable conservadurismo social del mandatario evidenciado a lo largo de su campaña en distintas materias como el enfoque de género, la centralidad de la familia, la violencia contra la mujer, el aborto y un largo y penoso etcétera. Aunque tratando de evadir esos campos, su mirada empata con la distancia que tienen sectores significativos del mundo popular, el urbano y especialmente el rural, en estas materias
  53. ^ Aguilar de la Cruz, Hedilberto (20 December 2022). "Respuesta de los grupos religiosos a la convulsión política en Perú". El Independiente (in Spanish). Retrieved 29 May 2025. Castillo es conservador en temas valóricos (política contra los derechos sexuales y reproductivos y educación sexual integral que unen a la derecha popular), católico y rodeado de evangélicos, tuvo una agenda concordante con fujimoristas e izquierdistas conservadores, lo cual no le valió las suficientes simpatías de la derecha por su postura económica de izquierda, tanto como su origen rural andino, alguien al margen de la élite tradicional e incluso las nuevas élites políticas mestizas a quien intentan anular (Goldstein, 2022)
  54. ^ a b Cabral, Ernesto (29 August 2021). "Autoritarismo y obsesión por el poder: el discurso antidemocrático de Vladimir Cerrón". Ojo Público (in Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2025.
  55. ^ Díaz, Mario (8 December 2022). "Pedro Castillo, esperanza populista, homófoba y antiabortista de Perú que huyó por la puerta de atrás". El Español (in Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2025. [R]esultan tan irónicas como la lectura de los elogios que la izquierda populista de medio mundo le dedicó el día de su nombramiento, calificándole incluso, en palabras de la vicepresidente españolaYolanda Díaz, como "brizna de esperanza para Perú" y "oportunidad para la democracia"
  56. ^ "Pedro Castillo sobre la comunidad LGTBI: "tenemos que llevar al tacho de basura esa actitud"". Diario Ojo (in Spanish). 2 June 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  57. ^ "El factor caviar en la falacia del fujicerronismo". Perú Libre | Partido Político Nacional (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  58. ^ "Vladimir Cerrón, el polémico neurocirujano que se ha convertido en actor clave de la política peruana" (in Spanish). BBC News Mundo. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  59. ^ Rousseau, Stéphanie (10 March 2022). "Populismo y política antigénero en Perú: De la sociedad civil al escenario electoral". European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (113): 1–18. doi:10.32992/erlacs.10841. ISSN 1879-4750. Retrieved 24 February 2025. Tal como señalé arriba, el líder de su partido, Vladimir Cerrón, es un opositor declarado en contra de la ideología de género. La victoria de Pedro Castillo en la elección presidencial de 2021 implicó negociar el apoyo de otro partido de izquierda más progresista en cuestiones sexuales y de género, Nuevo Perú, lo cual puede explicar que estos temas hayan sido relegados a partir de la segunda vuelta electoral. En todo caso, el caso de Perú Libre muestra que la política antigénero encaja con la sensibilidad de ciertos sectores de izquierda
  60. ^ Páucar, Carlos. "Izquierda en el Perú: La primera vez en el Gobierno". UyPress - Agencia Uruguaya de Noticias (in Spanish). Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  61. ^ "Sostienen que triunfo de Pedro Castillo representa una parte muy importante del pueblo andino y amazónico". COPROFAM (in Spanish). Retrieved 23 February 2025.
  62. ^ swissinfo.ch, S. W. I. (30 July 2021). "Castillo tiene mucha izquierda, pocas mujeres y ningún ministro de Economía". SWI swissinfo.ch (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  63. ^ "La guerra entre Cerrón y los caviares paraliza a Castillo | EL MONTONERO". EL MONTONERO | Primer Portal de opinión del país (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  64. ^ Tanaka, Martín (9 November 2021). "Sobre el "caviarismo", por Martín Tanaka" (in Spanish). El Comercio. ISSN 1605-3052. Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  65. ^ "Denuncian que dueño de la casa de Sarratea gestionó reunión entre el presidente y empresario minero". Perú21 (in Spanish). 27 March 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  66. ^ "Las privilegiadas visitas de pastores evangélicos a congresistas y Palacio de Gobierno". Wayka.pe (in Spanish). 12 August 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  67. ^ "El entorno evangélico de Pedro Castillo que lo estaría asesorando en polémicas decisiones". infobae (in Spanish). 13 August 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  68. ^ "Presidente no observó ley que pone en riesgo enfoque de género en textos escolares, pese a recomendaciones del Mimp y la Defensoría". RPP (in Spanish). 17 June 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  69. ^ Saldarriaga, Rodrigo (4 February 2022). "Los 'caviares' peruanos rompen su alianza con Pedro Castillo". LA GACETA (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  70. ^ "Crisis política. Se mantiene la orientación derechista y conservadora en el cuarto gabinete de Pedro Castillo". La Izquierda Diario - Red internacional (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  71. ^ "La crisis permanente del destituido Pedro Castillo – DW – 07/12/2022". dw.com (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  72. ^ admin.noticias (27 June 2021). "Aníbal Torres: "Por supuesto que [Castillo] se ha alejado de Cerrón y no tiene nada que ver con eso"". Sudaca - Periodismo libre y en profundidad (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  73. ^ "Kelly Portalatino: El presidente tiene malos asesores". Canal N (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 April 2025.
  74. ^ Castro Cajahuanca, Jonathan (2023). "El largo plan congresal". Quehacer. Retrieved 23 February 2025.
  75. ^ "Perú Libre y Waldemar Cerrón: ¿Cómo se gestó su inclusión en la lista de la derecha para la Mesa Directiva?" (in Spanish). El Comercio. 24 July 2023. ISSN 1605-3052. Retrieved 20 February 2026.
  76. ^ Palomino, Eva (28 July 2025). "Perú Libre usó sede del Congreso para hacer propaganda política a prófugo Vladimir Cerrón". larepublica.pe (in Spanish). Retrieved 28 July 2025.
  77. ^ "La Patria Grande defiende a Castillo, su 'hijo pródigo'". El Mundo (in Spanish). 11 December 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2025. "[...] Esa es la lógica que tuvo [la Patria Grande] frente a Morales, frente a Correa después de los casos de corrupción y es la misma lógica que mantiene con Castillo. Es una visión clásicamente populista y en esta visión el presidente líder encarna la voluntad de la nación ante la que ningún freno, contrapeso o proceso de destitución, aunque esté contemplado por la ley, incluso provocado por un acto autoritario, puede ser respaldado", detalla para El Mundo el historiador Armando Chaguaced
  78. ^ Ortiz, Guillermo (20 December 2022). "Perú se rebela ante el populismo en favor de Castillo en América Latina y de Podemos". El Español (in Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2025. Los cuatro líderes de la izquierda populista latinoamericana han seguido un proceso similar: primero, condenaron las veleidades autocráticas de Castillo y su intento de prescindir del poder legislativo
  79. ^ Centro Wiñaq (16 January 2023). "La polarización política frente a las protestas". RPP Noticias (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025. [La] demanda no es apoyada por la izquierda progresista, especialmente la limeña, que votó a favor de la vacancia de Pedro Castillo y que acepta que intentó perpetrar un golpe de estado
  80. ^ Palacios, Oswaldo (28 July 2025). ""Cómo has cambiado, pelona": Flavio Cruz lamentó el mensaje "derechizado" de Dina Boluarte". rpp.pe (in Spanish). Retrieved 28 July 2025.
  81. ^ Goldstein, Ariel (19 September 2024). La cuarta ola: Líderes, fanáticos y oportunistas en la nueva era de la extrema derecha. Marea Editorial. p. 63. ISBN 978-987-823-056-6. Retrieved 20 February 2025. Este periodo permitió una recuperación de la derecha en Perú, que fue capaz de quebrar al gobierno de Castillo para introducir un programa conservador y neoliberal de espaldas al voto mayoritario. [...] Los cholos, los negros y los habitantes de provincias fueron reemplazados por los militares, policías y grupos religiosos representados por el presidente del Congreso, Willams, y el alcalde de Lima, López Aliaga. Estos actores políticos se han convertido en los principales apoyos de Boluarte
  82. ^ Casimiro Ore, Diego (10 June 2025). "Pedro Castillo confunde el Tratado de Alta Mar con Convemar: Acusa a Dina Boluarte y al Congreso de "traición a la patria"". infobae (in European Spanish). Retrieved 12 June 2025.
  83. ^ Cerrón, V. (6 February 2025). "Hoy queda claro que en el Perú operan dos tipos de izquierda: la IZQUIERDA DE USAID y la IZQUIERDA POPULAR".
  84. ^ "La ideología de la nueva izquierda popular". Perú Libre | Partido Político Nacional (in Spanish). Retrieved 12 February 2025.
  85. ^ a b Mandujano, Edgar (19 February 2026). "Vladimir Cerrón celebra triunfo político en el Congreso". Caretas (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 February 2026.
  86. ^ "Vladimir Cerrón presiona al nuevo presidente José María Balcázar: "Debe empezar por la baja de Óscar Arriola"". infobae (in European Spanish). 19 February 2026. Retrieved 19 February 2026.
  87. ^ Calderón, Camila (23 February 2026). "José María Balcázar se distancia de Perú Libre: asegura que "el socialismo ya cayó" y destaca presencia de Hernando de Soto". infobae (in European Spanish). Retrieved 24 February 2026.
  88. ^ RPP, Redacción (10 March 2026). "José María Balcázar tilda de "chiste" versiones sobre presión de Vladimir Cerrón para cambiar el Gabinete". RPP (in Spanish).
  89. ^ Casimiro, Diego (28 March 2026). "Vladimir Cerrón reconoce tener una "gran amistad" con José María Balcázar y responde si impuso ministros". infobae (in Spanish).
  90. ^ Ríos Sierra, Jerónimo (5 May 2020). "Semblanzas revolucionarias de la izquierda peruana: Haya de la Torre, José Carlos Mariátegui, Alan García y Sendero Luminoso". Araucaria (in Spanish). 22 (43). ISSN 2340-2199. Retrieved 22 February 2025. Por lo expuesto, hay quien pudiera pensar que Sendero Luminoso abrazaba una suerte de vanguardia feminista a tenor del poder de la mujer en la estructura armada. [...] La asignación de roles siempre respondió a dinámicas patriarcales (Degregori, 2016) y el feminismo nunca fue bien acogido por Sendero Luminoso. Como sugería "Norah", Sendero era una milicia de mujeres cuya única lucha era y debía ser contra el imperialismo y el feudalismo que tenía lugar en Perú
  91. ^ Jima-González, Alexandra; Paradela-López, Miguel (1 November 2021). "The Negative Impact of Shining Path on Indigenous Mobilization in Peru: An Approach from Political Opportunity and New Social Movements Theories" (PDF). Latin American Perspectives. 48 (6): 194–209. doi:10.1177/0094582X211031920. ISSN 0094-582X. Retrieved 28 February 2025. In this sense, Shining Path systematically promoted the abandonment of the indigenous identity and the reorientation of indigenous political claims toward a peasantbased agenda. This attitude is consistent with those of the traditional left, which tended to consider cultural diversity as something that would disappear with the unification of the working class (Selverston-Scher, 2001: 65). About this reality, Degregori points out that Shining Path's "official documents entirely omit the ethnic dimension or directly reject Andean cultural re-evaluation as 'folklore' or bourgeois manipulation" (Degregori, 1991: 243). Consequently, despite their formal recognition, indigenous values were subject to increasingly hostile attitudes from Shining Path's leaders
  92. ^ Ubilluz, Juan Carlos (30 June 2024). "De cómo la singularidad de la derecha radical populista en América Latina permite repensar a la derecha radical populista global". Letras (Lima) (in Spanish). 95 (141): 12–39. doi:10.30920/letras.95.141.2. ISSN 2071-5072. Retrieved 22 February 2025. Dado que el neoliberalismo no gozaba de una amplia aceptación entre los peruanos, Keiko ofreció una buena cantidad de programas asistenciales. No es que hubiese virado hacia el centro keynesiano; es más bien que, para salvar el "modelo", era necesario ceder en algo a las demandas populares
  93. ^ "Pedro Castillo califica de "estupidez del fujicerronismo y la derecha" la ruptura diplomática con México". Exitosa Noticias (in Spanish). Retrieved 22 November 2025.
  94. ^ Red de Medios Regionales Perú (22 March 2026). "Sánchez se proclama heredero de Castillo y acusa a Perú Libre: "Son traidores que gobiernan con el fujimorismo"". Inforegión | Agencia de Prensa Ambiental (in Spanish). Retrieved 25 March 2026.